\u3cem\u3eThe Great Gatsby\u3c/em\u3e, The Black Sox, High Finance, and American Law by Boyer, Allen
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 88 Issue 2 
1989 
The Great Gatsby, The Black Sox, High Finance, and American 
Law 
Allen Boyer 
Special Counsel, Division of Enforcement, New York Stock Exchange 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Allen Boyer, The Great Gatsby, The Black Sox, High Finance, and American Law, 88 MICH. L. REV. 328 
(1989). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol88/iss2/4 
 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
ESSAY 
The Great Gatsby, the Black Sox, High Finance, 
and American Law 
Allen Boyer* 
The Great Gatsby, by F. Scott Fitzgerald, is the great novel of 
America in the 1920s. It is about someone pursuing a girl, and, more 
than that, it is about someone pursuing a dream. Jay Gatsby is some-
one who believes in the American dream of success. His life plays out 
the most famous piece of repartee between Fitzgerald and Hemingway 
- that the rich are very different from you and me, because they have 
more money. Gatsby is a man who thought that if he had the money, 
he would be rich, and could therefore be different. 
After reading Gatsby, one remembers the parties which its hero 
threw: dusk-to-dawn galas peopled by financiers, Broadway stars, and 
the polo-playing aristocracy. But behind the glitter there are occa-
sional glimpses of darkness. Gatsby is a man with no background. 
Some say he is the Kaiser's nephew, some have heard that he once 
killed a man. He has unsavory connections - perhaps even criminal 
connections. His past is a mystery, and there is something in his pres-
ent which he wants to conceal. 
What Gatsby's connections are, where he made his money, Fitz-
gerald keeps vague. 1 Nick Carraway, the narrator, asks Gatsby what 
business he is in. Gatsby replies, brusquely, "That's my affair" -
then apologetically realizes his rudeness, and says that he was in the 
drug business for a while, and that he was in oil for a while. 
It is just barely possible, given the timing, that Gatsby was in-
volved with Teapot Dome. And his pharmaceutical business meant 
bootlegging: he owned part of a chain of drug stores which sold grain 
alcohol over the counter. Tom Buchanan, his rival for Daisy 
Buchanan, reveals this bootlegging connection near the end of the 
* Special Counsel, Division of Enforcement, New York Stock Exchange. B.A. 1978, Van· 
derbilt University; J.D. 1982, University of Virginia; Ph.D. (English) 1984, University of St. 
Andrews, Scotland. - Ed. Thanks are due, for their contributions, to Kathleen Dicks, Eliot 
Asinof, Robert Ferguson, Daniel M. Gray, John R. Herrmann, James Kirby, Joel Lee, Brook 
Thomas, and Daniel Tritter. Opinions expressed in this essay are not necessarily those of the 
New York Stock Exchange or any of its officers. 
I. See generally Randall, Jay Gatsby's Hidden Source of Wealth, 13 Moo. FICT. STUD. 247 
(1967). 
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novel. But there is something else Gatsby is involved with. Even Tom 
Buchanan can't identify it, because his sources are too scared to talk. 
All we know is that, as Tom says, compared to it, the bootlegging is 
''just small change." 
Two shadows fall directly across Gatsby's career. We know that 
he is involved with stolen securities. He sounds out Nick, a bond 
salesman, about working for him: 
"[I]f you'll pardon my - you see, I carry on a little business on the side, 
a sort of side line, you understand. And I thought that if you don't make 
very much - You're selling bonds, aren't you, old sport?" 
"Trying to." 
"Well, this would interest you. It wouldn't take up much of your time 
and you might pick up a nice bit of money. It happens to be a rather 
confidential sort of thing."2 
At the novel's end, when Nick answers a phone call in Gatsby's empty 
house, he finds out what this sketchy invitation meant. The man on 
the long-distance line from Chicago tells him: "Young Parke's in 
trouble. They picked him up when he handed the bonds over the 
counter."3 
We also know that Gatsby is the business partner of Meyer Wolf-
sheim - and that Wolfsheim is the man who fixed the 1919 World 
Series. Nick remembers their introduction: 
"[H]e's a gambler." Gatsby hesitated, then added coolly: "He's the man 
who fixed the World's Series back in 1919." 
The idea staggered me. I remembered, of course, that the World's 
Series had been fixed in 1919, but if I had thought of it at all I would 
have thought of it as a thing that merely happened, the end of some 
inevitable chain. It never occurred to me that one man could start to 
play with the faith of fifty million people - with the single-mindedness 
of a burglar blowing a safe.4 
Both of these scandals - securities fraud and the Black Sox - trace 
back in fiction to Meyer Wolfsheim. In life they trace back to Wolf-
sheim's real-life counterpart, Arnold Rothstein. 
I. CAPITAL AND THE UNDERWORLD 
Arnold Rothstein was the first great financier of organized crime. 
Rothstein talked very little about himself. Others, however, called 
him "the Brain" and "the Big Bankroll." His attorney, William Fal-
2. F.S. FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY 83 (Hudson River ed. 1980). 
3. Id. at 167. 
4. Id. at 74. For the best history of the Black Sox scandal, see E. AsINOF, EIGHT MEN OUT: 
THE BLACK Sox AND THE 1919 WORLD SERIES (1963). 
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Ion - unsurpassed for courtroom eloquence, but so crooked that he 
makes Roy Cohn look like a saint - described Rothstein as "a man 
who dwells in doorways. A mouse standing in a doorway, waiting for 
his cheese."5 
We will not discuss Rothstein's role as the contact man between 
Tammany Hall and the New York City underworld. We will not dis-
cuss his role in labor union racketeering. We will not discuss his role 
as mentor to John T. Nolan, Arthur Flegenheimer, and Charles Luca-
nia - who would later be known, respectively, as Legs Diamond, 
Dutch Schultz, and Lucky Luciano. We will not discuss his interests 
(financial, not personal) in heroin and cocaine. We will mention only 
briefly his role as the man behind New York's first bootlegging opera-
tions - briefly, because the point requires no particular explanation. 
We will discuss his role as a gambler and a mastermind of securities 
fraud. 6 
Fixing the World Series was only one episode in Rothstein's ca-
reer. He played the horses, played high-stakes craps and higher-stakes 
poker, and sometimes cut cards at $40,000 a cut. He would bet on 
literally anything, from the serial numbers on dollar bills to the license 
plates on passing cars. He owned and managed gambling houses. On 
and off the race-course, he was to ordinary bookies what reinsurance 
companies are to the insurance trade. 
As an underworld financier, Rothstein was the man who probably 
masterminded (or fenced) the Liberty Bond thefts of 1918-1920, in 
which $5 million of bonds were stolen. 7 He was an insurance broker, 
appreciating the value of a business which offered a steady flow of cash 
and checks.8 In the years bracketing World War I, moreover, he was 
the man who stood behind the bucket-shops of New York City. 
A bucket-shop was a discount retail securities house. Some 
bucket-shops were legitimate; many others were not. These buck-
5. See L. KATCHER, THE BIG BANKROLL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ARNOLD ROTHSTEIN 
8 (1959). 
6. On Rothstein's career, see generally D. CLARKE, IN THE REIGN OF ROTHSTEIN (1929): 
G. FOWLER, THE GREAT MOUTHPIECE: A LIFE STORY OF WILLIAM J. FALLON (1931); L. 
KATCHER, supra note 5; C. ROTHSTEIN, Now I'LL TELL (1934) (memoir ofRothstein's widow). 
7. See L. KATCHER, supra note 5, at 179. Arrested for these thefts, but never convicted, was 
Nicky Amstein, then the husband of Fannie Brice. Amstein insisted that he had been framed, 
which may well be true. Id. at 174-75, 180. 
8. By some accounts, Rothstein used insurance as an enforcement mechanism. By requiring 
those who borrowed from him to take out insurance and name him as the beneficiary, he let his 
debtors know that they were funding the price he would put on their heads, should they default. 
See L. MORRIS, INCREDIBLE NEW YORK: HIGH LIFE AND Low LIFE OF THE LAST HUNDRED 
YEARS 346 (1951). It seems as likely, if less dramatic, that Rothstein made himself his clients' 
insurer to prevent them from obtaining an independent source of capital by burning down their 
properties. 
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eteers were not above advertising their house stocks, knowing them to 
be worthless. A common practice was to make a phone solicitation, 
pocket the money, and postpone filling the order. If the customer's 
stock went down, the bucketeer could buy the shar~ at that lower 
price and keep the difference. If the stock went up, he would persuade 
the customer to roll over the money into a new investment. 
Leo Katcher, Rothstein's biographer, wrote: 
No official total of bucket-shop "take" has ever been compiled. Nat J. 
Ferber, the New York American reporter who did more to expose buck-
eteers and their activities than any other newspaperman, estimated their 
take in his book, I Found Out, as $6,000,000,000 .... 
This much is on the record. In New York State, in one five-year 
period, bucket shops went into bankruptcy owing their customers more 
than $212,000,000! 9 
To stay in business, the bucketeers needed protection, which Rothstein 
provided. When circumstances caught up with them, he was 
indispensable in providing bondsmen and lawyers. 
In 1922 and 1923, the biggest of the bucketing scandals was con-
stantly in the press. E.M. Fuller & Company, the largest brokerage 
house on the Consolidated Exchange, had gone into bankruptcy, ow-
ing its customers an amount estimated at $5 million. The trials that 
followed - no fewer than four of them - brought out Rothstein's 
involvement with New York's bucket-shops. Edward M. Fuller 
awaited arrest in Rothstein's house, and Fuller's attorney was William 
Fallon. The firm's papers revealed that Rothstein had taken some 
$425,000 out of the Fuller company's coffers. 10 
For the rest of Rothstein's life, attorneys kept asking him questions 
about his ties to Fuller. William Chadbourne, the receivers' attorney, 
grilled Rothstein intensely over whether he had bet with Fuller on the' 
1919 World Series. Chadbourne sought to show that Rothstein had 
bet on a fixed Series. This meant, he argued, that Rothstein had ac-
quired the money under false pretenses, so that it therefore could be 
recovered for legitimate creditors. 
Rothstein's answers suggested that he used gambling to launder 
money. Paying off fictitious bets was an easy way to pass dirty money 
from one hand to another. But in this case, the wager had been legiti-
mate; triumphantly waving a canceled check, Rothstein proved that 
he had bet on the White Sox. 11 All Chadbourne could do was snap 
9. L. KATCHER, supra note 5, at 181. 
10. See generally H.D. PIPER, "THE GREAT GATSBY": THE NOVEL, THE CRITICS, THE 
BACKGROUND 171-84 (1970). 
11. L. KATCHER, supra note 5, at 200. 
332 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:328 
back that perjury obviously had no terrors for the witness. 12 
Here we find the connection to Gatsby. Scott Fitzgerald, after the 
success of This Side of Paradise, had become acquainted with the ce-
lebrities of New York City - a group that included the town's most 
prominent gambler. He would later recall that "[i]n Gatsby I selected 
the stuff to fit a given planned mood or 'hauntedness' ... always start-
ing from the small focal point that impressed me - my own meeting 
with Arnold Rothstein for instance."13 In Great Neck, Long Island, 
where Fitzgerald wrote much of Gatsby, one can trace down another 
parallel. His neighbor, a man known for his society connections and 
his interest in aviation, was Edward M. Fuller - of E.M. Fuller & Co. 
II. AMERICAN PASTIMES 
It is easy to gather why Fitzgerald decided that Gatsby would be 
involved with bootleg liquor and with stolen bonds. These were the 
most notorious crime waves of the day. A more revealing question is 
why Fitzgerald named fixing the World Series as the third of the 
crimes with which Gatsby is connected. 
This may have been because he knew Rothstein and Fuller. While 
Fitzgerald was writing Gatsby, he saw Ring Lardner almost daily, and 
Lardner had been involved in uncovering the Black Sox scandal. But 
the most important reason is that Fitzgerald was a student of history, 
and recognized what baseball had come to mean to America. 
Baseball, during the Progressive Era, had become more than a 
game. 14 It had become emblematic of America's social structure. Its 
teamwork showed democracy in action; its fans were found among all 
classes of society; it taught America's traditional values to successive 
waves of immigrants; and it served as an annual ritual which united 
cities behind their teams. Walt Whitman called it "the hurrah game," 
and continued: 
[W]ell - it's our game; that's the chief fact in connection with it: 
12. See D. CLARKE, supra note 6, at 113-40. Stock-bucketeering and baseball gambling in-
tersected at other points. Charles Stoneham, the owner of the New York Giants, was alleged to 
be a sleeping partner in E.M. Fuller & Co. Stoneham had made his money as a stock-bucketeer, 
and he would later handle the Havana end of a rum-running operation which Rothstein directed. 
It may not be coincidental that the Giants hired first baseman Hal Chase, who had been dropped 
from the Cincinnati Reds for trying to fix a game, and that Giants Manager John McGraw paid 
for the coffin in which William Fallon was buried. See L. KATCHER, supra note 5, at 192-93; 
H.D. PIPER, supra note 10, at 182-84; A. HYND, DEFENDERS OF THE DAMNED 182 (1960); see 
also E. AsINOF, supra note 4, at 14-15. 
13. A. TURNBULL, SCOTT FITZGERALD (1962) (quoting Fitzgerald). 
14. Chief among the social historians who have made this point is Steven Riess. See S. 
RIESS, TOUCHING BASE: PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL AND AMERICAN CULTURE JN THE PRO· 
GRESSIVE ERA (1980). 
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America's game: has the snap, go, fling of the American atmosphere -
belongs as much to our institutions, fits into them as significantly, as our 
constitutions, laws: is just as important in the sum total of our historic 
life.15 
Literature added sports heroes to the American pantheon. In dime 
novels, youngsters read of Frank Merri well, the only man ever able to 
throw the double curve. In real life, they could read of baseball mar-
tyr Christy Mathewson. Mathewson, after the close of a legendary 
pitching career, resigned as manager of the Cincinnati Reds to go 
overseas in World War I. In a training accident, he became a victim of 
poison gas. This led to his death, from tuberculosis, in 1925. 
The 1919 Series had been the first major sporting event in post-war 
America, and Fitzgerald had a life-long passion for sports. His first 
love was football (in particular, Princeton football), and he helped tie 
Gatsby together with motifs drawn from the athletic world. Jordan 
Baker is a professional golfer, about whom hangs a suspicion of cheat-
ing. Tom Buchanan was once one of Yale's most powerful ends, and 
the Buchanans' social environment is "wherever people played polo 
and were rich together." 16 The Black Sox scandal fit his fictional 
rhetoric. 
If cheating and fixed games hover in the background of Gatsby, 
and securities fraud is just off-stage, so too is another shadow which 
marked the Twenties. Gatsby's role as a bootlegger casts him as a 
peripheral figure in one of America's boldest experiments in social and 
constitutional history: the short, unsteady life of the eighteenth 
amendment, better known as Prohibition. ~ 
Prohibition, nowadays, is remembered ironically; pronouncing the 
word carries the implication that it was foolish to try to ban the sale of 
alcohol. It is only later, intellectually, that one appreciates that Prohi-
bition was an issue of constitutional magnitude. On July 17, 1919, the 
Constitution of the United States was amended to prohibit the sale of 
intoxicating beverages - and yet the people of the United States con-
tinued to buy intoxicating beverages. The law of the land was a popu-
lar nullity. To understand what this failure meant, in terms of 
American law, one must look back far before the Twenties. 
Ill. AMERICAN LAW: OLD FAILINGS AND NEW VISIONS 
For American jurisprudents, the original definition of law came 
from that suggested by Sir William Blackstone: law was a force which 
15. Folsom,America'.s ''Hurrah Game": Baseball and Walt Whitman, 11 IOWA REV. 68, 77 
(1980) (quoting Walt Whitman). 
16. F.S. FITZGERALD, supra note 2, at 6. 
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commanded the right and forbade the wrong. 17 Law and morality 
were related, perhaps even coextensive. 
In 1897 - when Scott Fitzgerald was one year old, and Arnold 
Rothstein turned fifteen - Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., proposed a 
radically different view. "I think it desirable," Holmes wrote, "to 
point out and dispel a confusion between morality and law .... " He 
went on to urge that the two be divorced: 
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a 
bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such 
knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his rea-
sons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer 
sanctions of conscience. . . . 
... The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing 
more pretentious, are what I mean by the law . 
. . . The duty to keep a contract at cpmmon law means a prediction 
that you must pay damages if you do not keep it, - and nothing else. If 
you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum.18 
And by logical extension, if an act is criminalized, this means only that 
those who commit it run the risk of being jailed. 
Holmes' comments laid the foundation for Legal Realism. During 
the early decades of this century, while this school of thought raised 
controversy within law schools, it seemed (with an odd, cynical preci-
sion) to restate the popular attitude. In the Twenties, to judge by the 
American people's response to Prohibition, morality seemed to have 
no part in law. No matter that Prohibition was enshrined in the Con-
stitution; the population ignored this super-legal commandment. It 
was as if Holmes' bad man, who cared nothing about morality, but 
only about penalties, now defined the public's view of law. 19 
17. Blackstone wrote: "[T]he primary and principal objects of the law are RIGHTS, and 
WRONGS ...• I shall follow this very simple and obvious division; and shall, in the first place, 
consider the rights that are commanded, and secondly the wrongs that are forbidden." 1 W. 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *122 (1783), quoted in D. BOORSTJN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCI· 
ENCE OF THE LAW 92-93 (1958). 
18. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897). Holmes found other 
influences to replace morality. Historical understanding was one; hence The Common Law's 
historical aspects. Holmes' amorality, too, bowed to social science and quasi-science. He himself 
was a Social Darwinist, willing to let law be rewritten by emerging social groups. If law did not 
embody morality, it should reflect the evolutionary struggle. See Gordon, Holmes' "Common 
Law" as Legal and Social Science, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 719 (1982). 
19. To be sure, other voices echoed Holmes. Roscoe Pound would talk about sociological 
jurisprudence. Charles Beard would frame the United States Constitution in an economic con· 
text, arguing with a great number of tables that it had been written by upper-class white men/or 
upper-class white men. Jerome Frank would insist that judges decide cases on the facts, and that 
lower courts overruled the Supreme Court every day. See Hopkins, The Development of Realism 
in Law and Literature During the Period 1883-1933: The Cultural Resemblance, 4 PACE L. REV. 
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It was acceptable, the Ameri9an people seemed to feel, to viola~e 
the Constitution. The result of the Black Sox trial, held in Chicago in 
the summer of 1921, seemed only to compound the irony. All eight of 
the White Sox players involved were acquitted. By the decision of that 
court, fixing the World Series, tampering with the faith of fifty million 
people, was not a crime. 20 
In Gatsby, one senses a similar moral vacuum. Characters muddle 
right and wrong, often willfully. People dislike dealing face-to-face 
with Myrtle Wilson, but they condone Tom Buchanan's keeping a 
mistress. Despite Nick's self-proclaimed honesty, he romanticizes 
Gatsby, although Gatsby is linked to t4e underwo:rld and is obsessed 
with a woman married to someone else. Even on Wolfsheim (who 
talks matter-of-factly of gangland killings, and whose cuff buttons are. 
made of human teeth), Nick speaks with moral detachment, as j.f 
lun~hing with gangsters were the same as W?tching strange beasts in a 
national park. 
The law, not surprisingly, plays little part in Fitzgerald's novel. 
Only two policemen actually appear. One flags down Gatsby for 
speeding, then salutes and apologizes when Gatsby flashes the police 
commissioner's personal card. The second officer appears after Myrtle 
Wilson's death. Seriously but impotently, he takes down information, 
opening a case which will never be solved. Even retribution miscar-
ries. At the novel's end, George Wilson desperately tries to avenge his 
honor and his wife's death; but Wilson is misled by the man who 
wronged him, and shoots Gatsby instead. Tom Buchanan, the cause-
in-fact of a fatal accident and a murder-suicide, bears no legal respon-
sibility for any of these deaths. Faced with this, Nick flees the East -
and although this is hardly a solution, Fitzgerald suggests no better 
one. 
IV. FROM MORALISM TO REGULATION 
From the Black Sox scandal, baseball emerged as a hitter's game, 
thanks to a livelier ball, which made it possible for Babe Ruth to hit 
scores of home runs every season. The same years were a turning 
29 (1983); see also Golding, Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy in Twentieth-Century America 
- Major Themes and Developments, 36 J. LEGAL Eouc. 441 (1986). 
20. The trial was flawed by design; the prosecuting attorneys agreed to try the case only on 
the flimsiest possible theory. See E. AsINOF, supra note 4, at 197-275. Even without this knowl-
edge, a Chicago editorial writer cut through to a conclusion reminiscent of Justice Holmes: 
The law and the jury seem to say that the question in such a conspiracy is not what you do 
but what you can get away with .... A case like this might seem unimportant'in compari-
son with disarmament, or world commerce, or the race problem, or prohibition. But at the 
bottom of every issue lies the national character. 
Chicago Herald and Examiner, cited in E. AsINOF, supra note 4, at 274. 
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point for American law.21 If law no longer meant morality, it would 
be reborn as governmental administration. If courts would not give 
justice, justice would be established - by other institutions, found 
throughout society. 
Ten years after Gatsby, the modem superstructure of federal regu-
latory agencies would cover the American economic landscape.22 
Under this new regime, the test for legality would not be morality or 
justice; it would be technical compliance, whether one had followed 
directions. The income tax is the best example. Al Capone was jailed 
not because he ran bootleg liquor, or ordered the massacre of his ene-
mies, or corrupted the politics of the city of Chicago; Al Capone went 
to Alcatraz because he omitted to pay his taxes.23 
The Securities Act of 1933 also fell into this category. It brought 
the issuance of securities under the scrutiny of the federal government 
- not by establishing a police force, but by prescribing a process to be 
followed, securities registration. In creating causes of action, this stat-
ute made liability hinge upon an objective standard: misstatements of 
fact. No longer did one hunt for a conman's scienter; no longer did a 
plaintiff have to prove reliance. Good faith and betrayal had been fac-
tored out of the legal calculus. 24 
Regulation also ended the high-flying era of open gambling. The 
parallel is worth considering: the gambling and securities communi-
ties had largely overlapped.25 Formerly, independent bookies had 
made their own odds and paid off bettors at different rates - but now 
all stakes were held by the track, a neutral party, and all bets were 
paid off at the closing odds. "Undesirable elements" might still be 
21. Stephen Jay Gould makes this connection in his foreword to Eight Men Out. See Gould, 
Foreword to E. AsINOF, supra note 4. 
22. It has been argued that Legal Realism, with its pragmatic approach, allowed American 
lawyers to accommodate themselves to administrative law as installed by the New Deal. B. 
ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 17-38 (1984). 
23. This would eventually have brought down, probably, Arnold Rothstein, who boasted of 
never having paid more than $150 a year in federal income tax. See D. CLARKE, supra note 6, at 
303. 
24. See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12, 17 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77q (1982)). 
Of course, scienter and reliance found their way back into the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
- but even here one finds § 16(b), which inexorably recaptures all profits made by corporate 
insiders on trades made within six months. Section 16(b) was enacted to curb an abuse favored 
by one of Gatsby's regular guests, James B. "Rot-Gut" Ferret: "[T]hey came to gamble, and 
when Ferret wandered into the garden it meant he was cleaned out and Associated Traction 
would have to fluctuate profitably next day." F.S. FITZGERALD, supra note 2, at 62. 
25. When Joseph "Sport" Sullivan sought to place a bet on the 1919 Series, he headed for the 
Chicago Board of Trade. E. AsINOF, supra note 4, at 36-37. In 1920, when gamblers spread 
rumors that the Yankees team had been involved in a train wreck, with Babe Ruth injured, this 
disinformation arrived over the private wire of W.E. Hutton & Co. Id. at 153. And this leaves 
to one side the Havana casino into which Charles Stoneham put much of his money. 
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involved, but now they had to work indirectly, facing the risks in-
volved in public scrutiny. 
Gaming commissions turned casinos into quasi-utilities. Just as 
government employees found thefr powers constrained by administra-
tive procedures, so casino employees had their discretion limited. In 
Nevada's casinos, "dealers were instructed to play according to fixed 
rules set by the house so that they never matched wits against the 
players."26 As much as any government regulation, these new stan-
dards were meant to ensure certainty and predictability - and the 
casinos, like the government, flourished. 
The old idea of law had been fallaciously simple. (How did one 
know exactly what rights were commanded, or what was so wrong 
that it had to be forbidden?) This new-model law avoided that prob-
lem, but it placed too much faith in complexity and detail. Eventually, 
it was bound to go too far. Within two decades, its capacity for con-
tradiction and paradox would be satirized by Joseph Heller, whose 
Catch-22 presented a world where rules prevented action.27 No mat-
ter how sophisticated the administrative schema, Heller would ob-
serve, there was bound to be a catch somewhere - and, inevitably, 
there would be. 
V. LAW OUTSIDE LAW: THE RISE OF SELF-GOVERNING 
INSTITUTIONS 
And as for the other shape which the new law took: 
The Legal Realists argued that law was only a system which im-
posed sanctions. If that is true, the converse must also be true: any 
system which imposes sanctions has a claim to be recognized as law. 
Here the Realists found themselves poaching on another discipline's 
terrain. Rejecting law's ties to morality and religious revelation, the 
Realists studied it as an aspect of human behavior - and so found 
themselves working side-by-side with social anthropologists. It is no 
accident that The Cheyenne Way, ·a study of American Indian juris-
prudence, was written by anthropologist E.A. Hoebel and arch-Realist 
Karl Llewellyn. 28 
Hoebel and Llewellyn wrote other books - certainly less idiosyn-
cratic books - but The Cheyenne Way is noteworthy as a study in 
legal anthropology. While confessing how hard it was to define law, 
the two jurisprudents tried yet again. It was wrong, Hoebel and Llew-
26. D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 74 (1973). 
27. J. HELLER, CATCH-22 (1961). 
28. E. HOEBEL & K. LLEWELLYN, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941). 
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ellyn thought, to say that law necessarily involved action by "officials 
of the political state." Functionally, "the vital difference [lay] between 
that deviation which is rebuked and that breach which is not."29 
Where sanctions were enforced, there one found law. Statutes passed 
by legislatures and decisions handed down by judges were only part of 
the total: "The total picture of law-stuff in any society includes, along 
with the Great Law-stuff of the Whole, the sublaw-stuff or bylaw-stuff 
of the lesser working units."3o 
In America, private institutions had taken on a quasi-legal role. 
The rise of the press illustrated the point. Once, newspapers had 
called themselves The Advertiser or The Democrat, admitting that 
they were commercial listings or political organs. By the tum of the 
century, however, they had declared their independence. (Or, at least, 
their headstrong self-will.) Now newspapers were political watchdogs. 
They would lobby for their chosen causes, rake muck against any can-
didate - even start wars, if their publishers chose. Their power was 
recognized with the sobriquet of the Fourth Estate, which implied that 
they ~ere constitutional bodies.31 
Even baseball found itself growing into this role. Before becoming 
baseball commissioner, Kenesaw Mountain Landis had been a federal 
judge. In assuming this new jurisdiction, he may have felt compelled 
to fill a vacuum. The very next year, Justice Holmes would declare 
that baseball was not interstate commerce, and so not subject to the 
antitrust laws.32 The contract which Landis wrote for himself (with 
lifetime tenure, financial security, and absolute power, above the poli-
tics of baseball leagues) duplicated his previous status. Technically, 
Landis remained a private citizen, and baseball remained only a popu-
lar pastime - but as its organization became effective, it increasingly 
mirrored the structures of political government. 
29. Id. at 23-24. 
30. Id. at 28. 
31. This point is captured wonderfully in the classically Progressive motto of Joseph Pulit-
zer's St. Louis Post-Dispatch, which still appears on its editorial page each day: 
THE POST-DISPATCH PLATFORM 
I know that my retirement will make no difference in [the Post-Dispatch's] cardinal princi· 
pies, that it will always fight for progress and reform, never tolerate injustice or corruption, 
always fight demagogues of all parties, never belong to any party, always oppose privileged 
classes and public plunderers, never lack sympathy with the poor, always remain devoted to 
the public welfare, never be satisfied with merely printing news, always be drastically in-
dependent, never be afraid to attack wrong, whether by predatory plutocracy or predatory 
poverty. 
April 10, 1907 Joseph Pulitzer 
32. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Prof. Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 
200 (1922). Or was Landis trying to take the sport outside the sphere of government regulation? 
Before the scandal, as a judge, he had himself stalled action on antitrust suits against organized 
baseball. 
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With this in mind, one should look at how the Black Sox scandal 
finally found its resolution. The day after the verdict in the Chicago 
trial, Commissioner Landis issued this edict: 
Regardless of the verdicts of juries, no player who throws a ball game, no 
player that undertakes or promises to throw a ball game, no player that 
sits in conference with a bunch of crooked players and gamblers where 
the ways and means of throwing a game are discussed and does not 
promptly tell his club about it, will ever play professional baseball. 33 
Landis spoke with the finality of formal government; none of the Black 
Sox ever again played professional baseball. · 
The Commissioner's findings were challenged (implicitly) in law-
suits brought by Buck Weaver and Shoeless Joe Jackson. Both sued 
White Sox owner Charles Comiskey for the balance due on their em-
ployment contracts - arguing that they had always played to the best 
of their ability, and so had not breached their agreements with him. 
Neither prevailed. Weaver lost his suit (although he badgered Comis-
key into a settlement). Jackson won a jury verdict, which the judge set 
aside. 34 Outside the court, Weaver met repeatedly with Landis, urging 
mitigating circumstances, and Jackson's fans petitioned to have the 
case reviewed. Neither of these approaches changed one syllable of 
the decree. 
As Hoebel and Llewellyn remind us, law is not only formal law; it 
can be found in the customs, traditions, and other value structures of a 
society. In this broader meaning, as Fitzgerald sensed, what the Black 
Sox did violated the law. Their suspension by Landis was a rebuke of 
this violation. The legitimacy of this decision - and the legitimacy of 
the new order of law - is shown by the fact that the order was never 
undone by any court. Eventually, even federal courts, even when con-
stitutional rights were involved, would explicitly defer to the judgment 
of sports officials. 3s 
33. E. AslNOF:supra note 4, at 273 (quoting Landis). 
34. Although substantive law had proved unable to handle the Black Sox affair, adjective law 
took an inexorable vengeance. Weaver's case was dismissed when his lawyers failed to appear in 
court. Jackson's verdict was set aside because, the judge said, the plaintiff had perjured himself, 
telling one story to the grand jury that had indicted the Black Sox, and another on the witness 
stand. E. AsINOF, supra note 4, at 279-92. 
35. In 1961, for example, Judge Irving Kaufman would find that a professional sports league 
"could reasonably conclude that in order to effectuate its important and legitimate policies 
against gambling, and to restore and maintain the confidence of the public ... it was necessary to 
enforce its rules strictly." The reason, at bottom, was that "every league or association must· 
have some reasonable governing rules." Molinas v. National Basketball Assn., 190 F. Supp. 241, 
243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Witness also the dispute over where constitutionally implied rights of 
privacy should yield to the need to keep sports clean by policing drug use. See, e.g.; Cochran, 
Drug Testing of Athletes and the United States Constitution: Crisis and Conflict, 92 DICK. L. 
REV. 571 (1988). 
In 1989, organized baseball eked out a victory over both state courts (too eager, perhaps, to 
please local voters) and a federal bench drilled to respect due process and individual rights. 
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VI. THE NEW METROPOLIS 
Looking back to Scott Fitzgerald, it is eerie how well The Great 
Gatsby predicted the end of the Twenties. Arnold Rothstein died in 
1928, mortally wounded as he left a poker game in a Manhattan hotel. 
Documents found among his papers showed the connection between 
Tammany Hall and the underworld. These scandals brought to office 
the reform administration of Fiorello LaGuardia, and brought to na-
tional prominence New York Governor Franklin Delano Roosevelt. 
The Liberty Bond boom of the early 1920s touched off the stock-
market speculation which characterized the rest of the decade. This 
helped cause the Great Depression, and led, in tum, to the securities 
legislation of 1933 and 1934. 
In the middle of the Jazz Age, Fitzgerald had foreseen that the 
music was bound to stop. The political and financial elites had been 
humbled; the old order had been brought low. And the new metropo-
lis, even while Fitzgerald was writing Gatsby, was already rising. 
Part of Gatsby's modem appeal is its portrait of vanished Long 
Island: a working countryside, set off from New York by the growing 
town of Queens. The roads are nineteenth-century lanes. In investi-
gating the deaths that close the novel, the police can ascertain which 
cars took a given route, and when. Yet within one generation, modem 
highways would criss-cross Long Island, and its villages would be-
come New York City's suburbs - thanks to Robert Moses, America's 
greatest builder of public works. 
In 1923, Moses was surveying parkway routes across Long Island. 
In.the next four decades, he would change the shoreline of Manhattan 
Island, link the outer boroughs with bridges and tunnels, blast express-
ways through miles of apartment houses. Moses gave New York City 
its parklands and beaches; he tore down old neighborhoods and raised 
up new ones; he created Lincoln Center and the South Bronx. 36 
Moses controlled New York's public authorities: the Triborough 
Bridge Authority, City Tunnel Authority, City Housing Authority, 
City Planning Commission, State Public Works Department, State 
Power Authority, State Council of Parks, and other government 
boards. He would be known as "the Coordinator." This referred to 
Commissioner A. Bartlett Giamatti, after a free-wheeling jurisdictional squabble, cut short a case 
which seemed bound for months of litigation by banning Cincinnati Reds Manager Pete Rose 
from the game for life for allegedly betting on games. See Chambers, Pete's Fans Learn What 
Lawyers Do, Natl. L.J., Sept. 11, 1989, at 13; He's Out!, N.Y. Post, Aug. 24, 1989, at 1. 
36. See R. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK 2-
21 (1974). 
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his position as City Construction Coordinator, and acknowledged his 
role as the man who shaped the new New York. 
Public authorities, originally, had performed the ministerial work 
of government. They covered only single projects (if a bridge or a 
turnpike were needed, an authority would be set up to build it), and 
they went out of existence when those projects were paid for. Moses 
changed all that. He won for public authorities the power to refinance 
their bonds, which gave them perpetual existence. He won for them 
the right to keep collecting commuters' dimes and quarters, even after 
every project had been paid off. Finally, he made authority decisions 
unreviewable by sealing them with bond indentures, agreements which 
the Contracts Clause protected against governmental second-guessing. 
To build Long Island's parkways, Moses assumed the power to 
acquire acreage without a prior hearing and without prior payment -
simply and literally, by sending men onto land, declaring it confis-
cated, and telling the owner to apply for compensation. This was 
comprehended by the legislative declaration that the Long Island State 
Park Commission might acquire land by appropriation "in the manner 
provided by section fifty-nine of the conservation law."37 The power 
to construct thoroughfares "connecting" with the Triborough Bridge, 
the power to build and operate public projects "not inconsistent" 
"with the use" of the Triborough Bridge - these elastic terms gave 
Moses the power to plan an entire city, which he ruthlessly 
exercised. 38 
In an age of statutes and regulations, those people rule who know 
the laws' hidden meanings - those people who have mapped out, 
through a circuit of obscure connections, the lines along which power 
flows. Moses showed how draftsmanship could be cryptography and 
how personal control could be relayed through the forms of govern-
ment administration. Rothstein had worked in the gaps of law; Moses 
worked behind its structures. 
In Middle Queens, in the days when he was building parks, Robert 
Moses found 127 vacant acres - part of the estate of Arnold Roth-
stein. Rothstein's money had vanished. The land remained, the only 
tangible portion of his legacy, but it lay under a heavy tax lien. So 
Moses, his biographer wrote, worked out a typically double-handed 
arrangement 
under which the city "bought" 74 of the 127 acres for $334,000 but the 
estate paid the $334,000 back to the city to clear the tax deficiency on all 
127 acres, leaving the estate with 53 acres free and clear - and the city 
37. Id. at 174. 
38. Id. at 627. See generally id. at 615-36. 
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with a 74-acre "Juniper Valley" park which it had acquired without a 
cent of cash outlay.39 
The new model of law had succeeded the old. Symbolically and func-
tionally, the Coordinator became the gangster's heir. 
39. Id. at 377. 
